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This paper analyses the persistence of colour bar reservations into the present day mining sector. 
Focusing on the occupations Banksman/Onsetter, Blaster, Engineer, Labourer and Winding Engine 
Driver, an ordered probit regression is run producing little evidence to support the persistence. A 
White skill bias is noted and further investigated using Oaxaca decomposition. Observable skill sets 
such as education, experience, demographics and firm level characteristics are unable to adequately 
explain the occupational gap between the races. This might suggests some skill based discrimination 
is still rife, however with various unobservable characteristics the model cannot control for; a causal 
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South Africa (SA) has had a varied and repressive history to date with democracy being a 
fairly new notion. Both the Colonial and Apartheid eras exhibited vast racial segregation that 
intended to keep the races
1
 stratified along economic and spatial lines. To achieve this end, 
legislature was used extensively in conjunction with other assorted means; the consequences 
of which are far reaching and not fully established yet. 
This paper looks purposely at the effect job reservation laws in the mining sector have had on 
the present day labour market. These laws dictated the exact jobs each race was allowed to be 
employed in, with White’s protecting the most skilled and highly remunerated jobs for 
themselves. It is the aim of this paper to determine whether these job reservations have 
persisted over time, by analysing the probabilities associated with each race holding the same 
specific occupations cited in pre-independence legislation in the present day. 
Focussing on the occupations Banksman/Onsetter, Blaster, Engineer, Winding Engine Driver 
and Labourer that are frequently cited in reservation laws, Labour Force Survey data is made 
use of from 2000 to 2013 to determine the likelihood of persistence. Despite data concerns, 
little evidence is found to suggest the restrictions have persisted at lower education levels to 
the present day mining sector. 
To further determine if some form of skill based discrimination has persisted, the paper 
converts occupation into a continuous variable and uses an Oaxaca decomposition (1973) to 
analyse how much of the occupational gap between the races can be explained by education, 
experience and other firm specific characteristics. It is found that a large portion of the gap 
cannot be explained with this model. It should be noted that the design of the analysis and 
dataset used suggest that considerable caution in interpreting the results as causal should be 
taken. However, the paper provides a plausible model through which, with the aid of more 
detailed data, could be used to analyse occupational gaps. 
The paper shall take up the following format. Section 2 describes the reservation and 
corrective laws associated with labour in South Africa. Section 3 scrutinises the methods 
through which these occupational transmission may have occurred. Section 4 looks closer at 
the data. Section 5 considers the ordered probit estimation model and its findings. Section 6 
addresses converting occupation into a continuous variable and making use of Oaxaca 
decomposition. Section 7 concludes, describing further research avenues and 
recommendations. 
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 These are: African/Native (Which the author refers to as Blacks), Asians, Coloureds and Whites. 
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2 Reservation Laws 
 
A detailed history of the colour bars and their effectiveness is analysed in this section. 
 
History of Job Reservation Laws in the Mining Sector in South Africa 
Slavery officially ended in the Cape of Good Hope (the then colony of the British Empire) in 
1834 after the British House of Commons passed the Slavery Abolition act of 1833. The 
slaves were legally free; however they were required to remain in the service of their current 
masters as apprentices for 4 more years.  
Following this, the Master and Servant Acts passed between 1841 (in the Cape) and 1910 
(when the Union was formed; joining the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and Orange River Colonies 
together) maintained the slavery like relationships between employer and employee (Simons 
& Simons, 1983; South African History Online [SAHO], n.d.). The laws stipulated any 
breach of employment contract became a criminal offence, punishable on the employee. 
Despite the term “servant” applying to all employees regardless of race, Whites were rarely 
prosecuted for said breaches (Simons & Simons, 1983). These laws ensured predominantly 
Black and unskilled
2
 labourers remained tethered to White employers (The Truth And 
Reconciliation Committee [TRC], 1998). 
The first direct colour bars were enacted in the mining industry in 1892 and 1893. Their 
purpose at the time was strictly safety related with the then State Mining Engineer, Joseph 
Adolf Klimke, focussed on reducing the significantly high number of deaths occurring in 
mines (Katz, 1999; Wilson, 2011: 7). Two operations were believed to have the highest 
likelihood of injury occurring; these were explosions and the hauling of people in cages and 
skips. The First and Second Volksraad (1892 and 1893 respectively) as a result passed laws 
forbidding “unskilled creatures
3
” from handling dynamite. Despite the laws, deaths per 
accidents remained particularly high in 1894 at 4.4 per 1000, compared to 1.6 per 1000 in 
England (South African Mining Journal, cited in Katz, 1999). 
The colour blasting bar was abandoned in 1896 as it made no provision to ensure White 
blasters were formally trained. Instead, the law now called for any “person” to acquire a 
blasting certificate before being allowed to handle dynamite (Law 12 of 1896 Sections 89 to 
92, cited in Simons & Simons, 1983). It was, however, by and large assumed that certificate 
holders would only be White, with the possibility of competent and experienced Blacks and 
Coloureds merely acting as assistants. 





, and they too were required to gain competency certificates (Katz, 1999). The 
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 Unskilled and semi-skilled jobs both generally have no academic application requirements; however the later 
offers on-the-job training while the former does not (Mariotti, 2011). 
3
 Asians, Blacks and Coloureds. 
4
 Person in charge of driving cages and skips that haul people. 
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engine driver restrictions had been motivated by mining unions in an attempt to ensure job 
security for the Whites (Simons & Simons, 1983; Roback, 1988). Mine owners would have 
preferred hiring experienced Black and Coloured workers instead as their wages were 
substantially lower.  
Through pressure from the Chamber of Mines and the Association of Mine Managers that 
was brought about by their belief that persons of colour could be just as competent as Whites 
in those particular jobs, the mining regulations were further amended. Banksmen and 
onsetters could be tackled by “qualified” persons, while machine-driver’s certificates could 
only be issued to “coloured” people (Law 11, 1897 Section 39 (m) and Law 12, 1898 Section 
104 cited in Alexander & Simons, 1959 and Simons, 1961). 
These laws were repealed in 1903, restating that only Whites could be employed as 
managers, engine drivers, banksmen and ontsetters (Government notice 826 of 1903 cited in 
Simons & Simons, 1983). This list grew in 1906 to include boiler attendant, lift operator, 
shift boss, surface foreman, mine overseer and mechanical engineer (Government notice 173, 
196 and 1232 of 1906, cited in Simons & Simons, 1983).  
What followed then was a series of laws whose intention was the restriction of skilled and 
semi-skilled jobs to Whites (regardless of their education level) as they offered higher 
economic remuneration, and had competition been allowed, they would have struggled to 
contend with informally-trained Black and Coloured workers (Doxey, 1961: 98). Unskilled 
manual and often unfavourable jobs were therefore left to Non-Whites.  
This ushered in the era of the Mine and Works acts, with the first being passed in 1911. Its 
motivation, however, was yet again claimed to be the protection of lives and limbs 
(Alexander & Simons, 1959; Simons & Simons, 1983). The law did not out-rightly assert any 
colour based discrimination (Mines and Works Act, No 12 of 1911, 1911), but rather gave the 
Governor-General the power to issue regulations determining who could attain competency 
certificates in particular jobs. In the Transvaal and the Orange Free State provinces, these 
certificates were not issued to persons of “colour”, and in addition those issued to “persons of 
colour” outside the provinces (in the Cape or Natal) were void when brought into these two 





 re-established the colour bars by stating only Whites and South 
African born coloureds
8
 could be issued competency certificates (Mines and Works 
Amendment Act, No 25 of 1926, 1926). Among other jobs, these included mine manager, 
overseer, surveyor, engineer, assayer
9
, blaster, winding engine driver, boiler attendant and 
lampman. While still guised under safety, these laws were pursued to prevent job competition 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5
 Banksmen and onsetters signal to operators of cages and skips. 
6
 They were re-invigorated by the coming to power of the coalition of the Labour Party and the National Party 
Alliance led by Hertzog in 1924 (Gardner, 1990: 19). 
7
 As a result it was commonly known as the Colour Bar Act (Alexander & Simons, 1959: 3). 
8
 Or had they resided in the Cape would be known as Cape Coloureds or Malays. 
9
 An analyst who performs chemical tests on metals. 
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(Doxey, 1961: 160). The 1956
10
 Amendment acted only to re-emphasise the reservations 
(Mines and Works Amendment Act, No 27 of 1956, 1956). 
When the Industrial Conciliation Act, No 28 of 1956 was passed which dropped Blacks from 
the very definition of employees and gave the Minister of labour the authority to reserve any 
job to a particular race, the mining sector was left to govern itself based on the Mines and 
Works Acts. The later amendment in 1959 dropped this exclusion; however, the industry 
maintained the pre-existing job reservations (Doxey, 1961: 143). The Industrial Conciliation 
Act further refused Black membership into trade unions (TRC, 1998; SAHO, n.d.). 
Other regulations passed were less direct, and instead prohibited the means by which 
particular races could attain relevant qualifications for said jobs. For instance, the Bantu 
Education Act No 47 (1953) and the Extension of University Education Acts No 45, 32 & 67 
(of 1959, 1960 and 1963 respectively), instituted separate educational systems that offered 
Blacks, and to a slightly lesser extent Coloureds and Asians, substandard education tailored 
to keep them unskilled. 
Compounding on this, the Apprenticeship Act (1922) and its amendment (1944) required 
potential candidates for various apprenticeship programs to have attained a minimum level of 
education
11
 unachievable at Non-Whites schools. This kept skilled jobs out of reach of the 
Non-Whites. It should be noted that the Act made no provisions for the apprenticeship 
training to maintain any standards, and, in fact, made no obligations to have apprentices pass 
any qualifying examinations (Doxey, 1961: 132; Wilson, 2011:12). Informally trained 
workers could possibly be just as knowledgeable about the job, with only race determining 
employment.  
 
Efficacy of Laws 
Job restriction laws passed over the pre-independence era generally formalized customs that 
were already inherent in the labour markets (Katz, 1999).  Consequently, dropping of any 
colour bars would have had little effect in changing hiring policies in some specific 
occupations. 
Mine owners and managers were, however, in constant conflict with job reservation laws as 
their main focus was profit maximisation which required hiring autonomy. Having to pay 
higher wages to Whites in jobs experienced (at times not necessarily) Blacks could do for a 
fraction of the cost made little economic sense
12
. An example of this came right after the first 
colour bar was instituted in September of 1892 forbidding Blacks from handling dynamite. 
Industry players lodged considerable protests stating it was logistically impossible to have 
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 As a result of the National Party’s coming to power in 1948 (Gardner, 1990: 19). 
11
 Minimum entry level was Standard VI (Apprenticeship Act of 1922, 1922; Wilson, 2011: 12) 
12
 Blacks were not legally regarded as employees (Industrial Conciliations Act No. 11 of 1924, 1924) and as 
such were not entitled to minimum pay (Wage Act No. 27 of 1925, 1925). 
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Whites at each explosion (Katz, 1999). This led to the law being redrafted in October the 
same year to allow Blacks to fire explosives, under the supervision of White Gangers
13
. 
Economic realities and general skill shortages, furthermore, created incentives to informally 
relax the restrictions, despite their strict enforcement. This was experienced, for example, in 
the 1950’s where Blacks were hired in semi-skilled jobs, which they legally were not allowed 
to hold, as the semi-skilled labour supply decreased due to rising White skill acquisition 
(Gardner, 1990: 19; Mariotti, 2011). This was brought about not by a change in racial 
predisposition, but rather by the increased returns that Whites could gain from pursuing 
higher skilled work or migrating to the expanding manufacturing sector, and thereby leaving 
semi-skilled jobs to Non-Whites (who were commonly still paid unskilled wage rates). The 
Apprenticeship Act also experienced circumventions either through occupational passing, for 
instance to Coloureds, or through blatant evasion (Doxey, 1961: 133). 
Lastly, it cannot be entirely ruled out that the word “coloured” might not have been 
misconstrued to mean “person of colour” instead of the “Coloured race” or vice versa in the 
interpretations of the laws. 
 
Laws that Sought to Redress Discrimination 
All job reservation laws were repealed in 1979 (Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, No 
94 of 1979). Subsequently, the newly elected African National Congress (ANC) government 
sought to correct the unjust work place discriminations and general inequality through further 
legislature in the form of Affirmative Action [AA] (Employment Equity Act, No. 55 of 1998, 
1998: chap 3) and Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment [BBBEE] Acts (BBBEE 
Act, No. 53 of 2003, 2004: s1).  
The efficiency of AA laws have been extensively researched and found to be most effective 
in increasing employment of minorities in years immediately after their enactment (Kalev, 
Dobbin & Kelly, 2006; Kurtulus, 2011). Miller and Segal (2011), and Long (2007) 
furthermore found that contingent on the laws being adequately enforced; these effects have 
been long lasting. They however have opposing opinions on the continued diversification 
effect once the laws have been terminated. Nevertheless, there has been no conclusive 
evidence as to the validity of the hypothesised negative effects of reverse discrimination or 
reduced productivity in the economy (Leonard, 1990). 
The Mine Health and Safety Act (1996: chap4 s41 and s45) established a Mining 
Qualification Authority (MQA) which in conjunction with the Skills Development Act (1998: 
chap1 s2) set about to use training and education to provide the previously disadvantage a 
chance of competing in the work force by redressing the educational disparity. They aim to 
achieve this goal by designing curricula, offering opportunities and funding, and monitoring 
their outcomes (MQA, 2003 – 2012). These initiatives take the form of basic, further and 
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 A supervisor of a group of African workers. 
7 | P a g e  
 
higher education and training, as well as apprenticeships, artisan training, learnerships and 
work-place training. 
Moreover, through the combined effort of the Competition Act (No. 35 of 1999) (amended in 
2000) and the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (No. 5 of 2000), businesses 
and employers were further forced to ensure active steps are taken to provide equitable 
opportunities for the previously disadvantaged. 
 
 
3 Intergenerational Transfer  
 
This section considers possible avenues through which intergenerational transfers may have 
assisted in passing the legislative colour bars through generations despite the reservation laws 
being repealed. 
Oppressive legislature has been found to have long lasting effects on the intended subjugates 
long after the laws have been repealed. Gaskin, Headen and White-Mean (2005) found that 
slavery, racial segregation and discrimination of African Americans had caused long term 
decreases in their health and wealth through inadequate human capital transmissions across 
generations. Similarly Dell (2010), using Peru’s “Mita” laws that were enacted to force 
indigenous communities to work in Spanish mines, showed after 200 years since the laws had 
ended, the inflicted communities exhibited lower consumption levels, increased stunted 
growth and under development of the communities at large. 
This echoes Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson’s (2002) idea of extractive institutions 
established by colonists where they concentrated power within a minority elite that offered 
expropriation of private property for the greater good. The result of which was the 
discouragement of investment and economic development, turning once prosperous 
communities into poor nations for example the Mughals in India and the Aztecs in Americas 
(Acemoglu, et al., 2002). 
Intergeneration transfers can be transmitted through socio-economic outcomes of a family. 
That is, parent’s socio-economic status is normally transmitted to a child. This occurs through 
the parent’s level of developmental nourishment in the form of education, healthcare, 
exposure, among others, that said parent can provide his/her child (Knudsen, Heckman, 
Cameron & Shonkoff, 2006). Taking this into account, equalising of social equity in the 
population would mean that poorer parents could provide more support to help their children 
have better standards of living.  
Building on this, Krueger (2012) and Corak (2013) expressed that the higher the income 
inequality experienced in a country, the lower the rate of intergenerational mobility across 
socio-economic classes. The transmission of innate abilities and nurturing into particular 
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careers would steer children into similar occupations as their parents. With SA’s high income 
inequality (Leibbrandt, Finnd & Woolard, 2012) high immobility would be expected, thereby 
maintain the reservations.  
Occupational transmissions would also be driven by social networks. Social networks have 
been used in varied settings to decrease costs of searching for jobs and to take advantage of 
more experienced workers connections (Munshi, 2003). This makes them a particularly 
effective tool for the disadvantaged members of society who experience the most difficulty of 
entering the labour force. The use of these networks then again have been found to be 
limiting with regards to movement away from low-skilled jobs as these networks only have 
foundations within low-skilled industries. Attempting to move to more skilled industries 
would mean no longer having access to the networks (Munshi, 2003). 
Employers also use these networks by requesting referrals from their already existing 
employee base. As these employees would know candidates personally, this would reduce the 
information asymmetry between employer and potential employee (Montgomery, 1991; 
Munshi, 2003). Employees refer individuals within their social networks and more so 
relatives when their performance is not related to the referees rewards (Beaman & Magruder, 
2012). Also high ability employees are better at screening and referring similarly high skilled 
individuals increasing likelihood of employment. 
Compounding this further, Hellerstein and Morrill (2011) established that as women in 
United States of America increasingly joined the labour market, the likelihood of them 
following the same profession as their fathers increased. Using father-in-laws occupations as 
counterfactuals, the increased probability was found to be attributed to human capital 
transmission effects from father to daughter. In comparison, son’s probabilities of following 
father’s occupation remain unchanged. 
Lastly, a decomposition of the large occupational gaps between Whites and Blacks in 1970 
and 1980 can be accredited to education differentials brought about by the segregation of 
educational systems (Mariotti, 2011). As intended, Blacks have remained relatively unskilled 
and thus have been unable to compete for high-skilled jobs. Jobs have, as a result, remained 
racially skewed. The highest and lowest skilled jobs have the largest intergenerational 
immobility (Eberharter, 2006). In addition, educational attainment can increase probability of 








This section gives a brief overview of the mining industry and data sets used in the paper. 
 
Mining Sector 
The South African mining sector ballooned from the discovery of the first diamond in 1867 
[SAHO, 1946] to the billion Rand industry it is today. It not only produces precious minerals, 
metals, and coal, but leads the world in various deposits, such as platinum and palladium. 
Mining as a function of nominal contributions to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
concentrated in North West, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and Gauteng Provinces. 
Since early 2000’s, direct employment in the mining sector has fluctuated between 406,000 
to a high of 524,632 in 2012. Remunerations have seen an annual real rise peaking at R 93.6 
billion in 2012 while paying R 11.6 billion in dividends and R 21.4 billion in tax. Mining 
contributed 8.3% of the GDP in 2012 (Chambers of Mines, 2013). 
Being such a vital industry in the South African economy as well as the first industry to 
introduce colour bars, the mining sector provides an interesting case study worth analysing 
further.  
 
Labour Force Survey Datasets 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) and Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) datasets were used 
in the analysis of this paper. LFS data was pooled from 2000 to 2007 and merged with QLFS 
data pooled from the first quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 2013. The data is collected 
by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA). 
LFS and QLFS are general purpose household surveys carried out across South Africa having 
about 30,000 representative dwellings in each survey, that are based on information collected 
during 1996 and 2001 censuses. Rotational panel methodology is employed in which 
dwellings are sampled again in subsequent surveys before being dropped out in about the 4
th
 
round in order to capture movements in and out of the labour market over time (StatsSA, 
2013). LFS is carried out biannually while QLFS is quarterly. The pooled dataset has a total 
of 917,507 observations of working individuals. 
There were concerns about duplication of individuals due to sample rotation and changing of 
methodologies employed in the surveys along the years
14
. For example, as the Unique 
Household identifiers were revised thereby not ensuring consistent identification, the same 
individual could potentially be included in the survey more than once. This would introduce 
multicollinearity that would reduce the precision of the estimates and their significance. 
Checking for duplicates based on race, gender, occupation, year commenced working and 
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 2005 saw a revision of the methodology, questionnaire and frequency of data collection, culminating in the 
conversion of LFS to QLFS in 2008. 
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highest education achievement attempted to control for this. Whereas race and gender could 
not be altered, it would be unlikely to expect the rest not to change over time, thus allowing 
for duplication. Alternatively, false matching where two different individuals were merged as 
one was an added concern that if true would result in erroneous output (Ranchod & 
Dinkelman, 2008).  
Unfortunately, with no alternative data sources and significantly few White and Coloured 
observations already, as well as the author’s lack of econometric know how to attempt to 
resolve the issues, the merged data was used as is. Data directly sourced from the Chamber of 
Mines would have been more appropriate with less sample error, but was unattainable. 
Limiting the dataset to only those employed in the mining sector, the total number of 
observations fell to 8,956: where 79.9% of these are Black, 15.3% White and 4.9% 
Coloured
1516
. Males make up 89.6% of the mining employees. Table 1 below shows some 
summary statistics of the data.  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Count Percentage % 
Race 
  
   Black 7,151 79.85 
   Coloured 439 4.90 
   White 1,366 15.25 
Demographics   
   Male 8,022 89.57 
   Female 934 10.43 
   Married 6,263 69.93 
Sector Characteristics   
   Occupations 210  
   Industries 11  
 Notes: Sample is restricted to the Mining Sector. 
  N = 8,956 
 Source: Author’s calculations using merged LFS and QLFS data sets. 
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 The full dataset had 26 Asians/Indians making up 0.30% of the sample. Due to lack of variability, they were 
dropped out of the sample. 
16
 These figures seem reasonable as 2001 Census data reveal Blacks making up 83%, Whites 14%, Coloureds 
3% and Asians 0.4% of the mining sector. 




 in the datasets was done using the four digit South African Standard 
Classification of Occupations (SASCO). This criterion allows for the specification of 
employees main activity that is required for the analysis below. 
5 Ordered Probit Estimations 
 
In this section the paper attempts to determine the probability that a particular race still holds 
the same occupations described in Section 2 above. To achieve this, an ordered probit 
regression as described by Greene (2011: 221) and used in Darden (2005) and Kasteridis, 
Munkin and Yen (2010) is employed.  
 
Selection of Dependent Variable 
Based on the laws listed in Section 2 above and the occupation categories available in 
SASCO, the analysis focuses on the following occupations: Banksmen
18
/ Onsetters, Blasters, 
Winding Engine Drivers, Engineers
19
 and Labourers. 
Blasting was the first occupation to be restricted on racial lines in 1892 where only Whites 
were allowed to handle explosives under the guise of safety. Repealed in 1986, the practice 
remained relatively unchanged until it was re-instated in 1926, adding Coloureds to the select 
few allowed. This continued until the end of the colour bars. 
Winding Engine drivers features significantly in job reservation legislation. It was first 
mentioned in 1893 (Section 12) where it was, at the time, regard as a skilled job limited only 
to Whites. It was further re-emphasized in Laws 11 and 12 of 1896. Legislation however 
changed in 1897 (Law 11), reserving the profession to Coloureds alone. This law was 
repealed in 1903, thereby re-instating the previous bar restricting the occupation solely to 
whites. In 1911, the Mines and Works act limited the post to both Whites and Coloureds, a 
stipulation that stood until the end of colour bars in 1979.  
Job reservation laws commonly regulated Onsetters and Banksmen. The 1893 legislation 
started by prohibiting Blacks, Coloureds and Indians from working in that capacity. It was 
again re-emphasized in 1896 and 1903 regulations. It was not mentioned out rightly again, 
however can be assumed to have been treated similarly to other skilled jobs at the time. 
The 1896 legislation as well, restricted Engineering (specifically mechanical) to only Whites. 
The restriction held until 1911, when Coloureds where legally added into the authorized elite. 
It was only repealed in 1979 with all other colour bars.  
Labourers were chosen to signify the general manual labour available in mines. These jobs 
were commonly left to Blacks and Asians. 
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 All employed persons aged 15 and above. 
18
 The term Banksmen includes Bankswomen 
19
 This includes all forms of engineering such as Civil, Electrical, Mechanical, Chemical and Mining. 
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Table 2 below shows a breakdown of each occupation by race. It is clear to see that the 
number of observations per race varies disproportionately. There is potentially too little 
variation of Whites and Coloureds in the sample to identify an effect, or that could imply a 
non random representation of the population at large. The results of any analysis would be 
unreliable or biased and could not be confidently extended to the population. The author was 
unable to find an alternative dataset with the relevant occupational break down shown here, 
and thus had to make use of this sample.  
 
Table 2: Selection of Occupations by Race 
Occupation Blacks Coloureds Whites Total Proportion 
 Banksmen/ Onsetter 810 8 34 852 33.3% 
 Blaster 100 1 11 112 4.4% 
 Engine Driver 430 4 13 447 17.4% 
 Engineer 62 3 28 93 3.6% 
 Labourer 989 35 34 1,058 41.3% 
Total 2,391 51 120 2,562  
Proportion  93.3% 1.99% 4.68%   
Source: Author’s calculations using merged LFS and QLFS data sets. 
 
Ordinal Probit Analysis 
The dependent variable            is ordinal in nature taking integer values from 1 to 5 for 
each individual i. Using the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status 
(ISEI) (Ganzeboom, De Graaf & Treiman, 1992)
20
 that is discussed in Section 6 below, the 
occupations are ranked as follows: Labourer, Banksmen, Blaster, Driver and Engineer. The 
ordered probit model makes use of the rankings and determines the probability of an 
individual falling in one of the occupational ranks. 
As the ordered rankings cannot be directly observed, the model makes use of a latent 
variable,           
   which is assumed to have a normal linear regression structure. That is:  
                           
                  (1) 
               if            
     
               if               
        
      
               if            
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 It must be assumed that each race values the ranking system identically, that is that individuals with equal 
qualifications have identical preferences with regards to occupation choice, regardless of race. 
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where             are cut off parameters derived from the data.  
From Equation (1), a predicted           
  of less than    assigns an individual the 
Labourer occupation; the lowest attainable rank. As           
  increases, the occupations 
assigned move up in a stepwise fashion based on the predicted  ’s. 
The estimated probability function of            has the form: 
                          
      
                            
          
      
                            
            
      
... 
                              
      
where Φ represents the standard normal density. 
From equation (1),     is a row of vectors constituting observable individual characteristics. 




, highest level of education attained, categorical working 
experience levels, province, marital status, gender and year the individual was surveyed 
variables. Blacks with less than 5 years of working experience residing in Western Cape 
Province and with no education are used as the reference.    represent the estimated 
coefficients, while     is the constant of each occupational level, k. The error term     is 
assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1.  
The ordinal probit regression is run to estimate the latent variable. It makes use of maximum 
likelihood estimators to determine the    coefficients. Robust standard errors are used to 
eliminate heteroskedasticity. 
It should be noted, education plays a considerable role in occupational attainment. As a 
result, the quality of the institution attended adds to this determination (Murdoch, 2003), over 
and above the maximum years attained. Two general theories are postulated in literature 
explaining the source of the differential. The first is the human capital aspect generated by the 
quality of the teaching staff and resources available to develop students’ hard and soft skills 
(Weiss, 1995; Murdoch, 2003). The second is the filtering or signalling feature, where the 




In an attempt to control for some of the unobservable school quality and by extension skill 
levels, the sample is further restricted to individuals that have not attained matriculation 
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 Macroeconomic conditions are known to affect an individual’s decisions to work or study further (Dellas & 
Koubi, 2003; Hérault, Kostenko, Marks & Zakirova, 2012; Johnson, 2013). Adding logs of GDP growth rate 
(The World Bank, 2014) and Unemployment rates from 1994 (IMF, 2014) produced robust results that had 
marginally higher coefficients but identical significance. 




. With generally lower skill levels required and assumingly less of a 
signal to future employers, this limitation attempts to control for endogeneity attributable to 
omitted variable bias. However, due to no nationally standardized test offered before 
matriculation, teaching practices, curriculum and quality differ considerably among Primary 
and Secondary schools (Taylor, van der Berg & Burger, 2011). Therefore the model attempts 
to test if job reservation restrictions have persisted at lower levels of education and skill in the 
mining sector.  
If the racial reservations have held, the following probabilities would be expected: Blacks 
would have the highest probability of being Labourers, while Whites and Coloureds would 
have higher probabilities with respect to Drivers, Blasters and Engineers. Whites would 
furthermore be expected to have the highest probability of being Banksmen/ Onsetters. 
Table 3 below presents the predicted z scores that an individual will be employed in the five 
occupations. The standard errors of the estimates are displayed in parentheses alongside their 
p-values.  
                                                          
22
 With only 26 and 39 Coloureds and Whites respectively in this restricted sample, lack of variation is a 
concern, bringing the reliability of the results into question. Running the same regression over the entire sample 
space produces near identical results as shown in Table A5 in the Appendix with their marginal effects in Table 
A6. This suggests the limiting does little to control for skill level. 
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Standard Errors p-value 
 
     Race 
        Coloured 
 
-0.774 *** (0.228) 0.001 
   White 
 
0.442 *** (0.107) 0.000 
      Education Level 















      Location 
        Eastern Cape 
 
-2.089 *** (0.795) 0.009 
   Northern Cape 
 
-2.193 *** (0.699) 0.002 
   Free State 
 
-1.443 ** (0.714) 0.043 
   Kwazulu-Natal 
 
-1.972 *** (0.751) 0.009 
   North West 
 
-1.691 ** (0.712) 0.018 
   Gauteng 
 
-1.440 ** (0.714) 0.015 
   Mpumalanga 
 
-1.839 *** (0.715) 0.010 
   Limpopo 
 
-2.270 *** (0.714) 0.001 
      Demographics 
        Age 
 
0.288 *** (0.097) 0.003 
   Married 
 
0.197 ** (0.077) 0.011 





   15 to 25 Years Experience 
 
0.447 *** (0.124) 0.000 
   More than 25 Years Experience 
 
0.354 *** (0.129) 0.006 
      Goodness-of-fit 
        Log-likelihood 
 
-2342.228 
      Wald chi
2
 with 20 df 
 
433.19 





      N 
 
2033 




, Male and year of survey control variable as well. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 *Significant at the 10 % level 
**Significant at the 5 % level 
***Significant at the 1 % level 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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The results show that at lower education levels, White’s are more likely to be employed in 
higher skilled jobs than Blacks, unlike Coloureds who are less likely than Blacks. Both race 
variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Differing levels of education prove not to be statistically significant at these low levels. 
Increased experience nevertheless, raises the likelihood of being employed as Drivers and 
Engineers. 
The marginal effects of the different races with respect to Blacks on the probability of being 
employed in particular occupations are shown in Table 4 below. These marginal effects 
signify the expected difference in probability between an average White or Coloured and a 
characteristically equivalent Black holding that job. Races not being considered at the time 
are set equal to 0, while all other variables are held at their means. 
 
Table 4: Marginal Race Effects 
Dependent Variable Labourer Banksmen Blaster Driver Engineer 
 
     Predicted Probabilities 
        P (Y=1|Black = 1) 0.384 0.401 0.041 0.166 0.008 
   P (Y=1|Coloured =1) 0.684 0.257 0.016 0.043 0.001 
   P (Y=1|White = 1) 0.231 0.405 0.055 0.285 0.025 
      Race Effect 
        Coloured Effect 78.13% -35.96% -61.99% -74.32% -90.89% 
   White Effect -39.98% 1.06% 32.84% 71.90% 207.60% 





, education, categorical experience levels, province, male and year. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
An average Coloured was 78.1% more likely to be a labourer than an equivalent Black, but 
on average about 65% less likely to hold all other occupations. Alternatively, an average 
White was 32.8%, 71.9% and 207.6%
23
 more likely to be a Blaster, Driver and Engineer 
respectively than an observationally equivalent Black. Furthermore, an average White was 
negligibly more probable at being a Banksman and less than 40% likely to be a Labourer than 
a comparable Black. 
To test for the robustness of these results, White and Lu’s (2010) approach to identify core 
and non-core covariates that cannot and can be dropped respectively to obtain meaningful 
results was used. 128 different regressions were run for Equation 1 each with different 
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 There are only 14 Black and 4 White engineers with less than matriculation certificates. 
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combinations of variables producing consistent marginal race effects with identical signs for 
each occupation and race. The Coloured effects remained roughly 5 percentage points from 
those in Table 4, while White effects fluctuated considerably. 
Assuming validity of the results, they suggest that the legislative colour bars passed in 
colonial and apartheid periods are not likely to have persisted to present day mining markets. 
Despite Whites showing a clear inclination towards higher skilled jobs after controlling for 
education and experience, Coloureds have in turn replaced Blacks in being employed in the 
least skilled occupations. This may allude towards some bias towards Whites being hired in 
more skilled jobs arising from the intergenerational transfers described in Section 3; however 
occupations are no longer fully aligned with the colour bars. 
This could be attributed to changes in the definition of “skilled” and “unskilled” jobs due to 
proliferation of technology
24
 as well as increased accessibility to education across all races
25
. 
As found in Mariotti (2011), economic incentives had already driven employers to hire Non-
White races into semi skilled occupations at the height of the regulations. It can as a result be 
assumed that Blacks moved up the occupational ladder. 
The change could also be attributed to the effect of Affirmative Action legislature. However, 
Burger and Jafta (2010) found that after 10 years the laws had at most had marginal effects 
on occupational attainment. Sallaz (2005) on the other hand, found that jobs in casinos had, in 
fact, been deskilled through installation of increased technology, thereby meeting BBBEE 
quota targets on employment, but not on share of power or skill. 
Extreme caution would however be required before concluding a White bias in higher skilled 
jobs is inherent due to the data concerns mentioned above. The next section of the paper 
attempts to probe if a bias is experienced throughout the mining industry, and if so could it be 
fully explained by observable characteristics. 
  
                                                          
24
 From as early as 1905 mechanical drills mere introduced, followed by locomotives and mechanical scrapers in 
1930s, then mechanical cactus grabs in the50s and mechanical loaders in the 60s (Wilson,2011: 84), that 
considerably transformed the working dynamics. 
25
 After the first student enrolled in South African School of Mines in 1896, there had been 380 mining 
engineering graduates that had been produced by 1997 across the differing institutions with increasing Black 
enrolments (Phillips, 1999). 
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6 Decomposition of Occupational Rank 
 
This section provides further empirical support to determine whether observable skill sets 
such as education and experience or other firm specific characteristics adequately explain the 
difference in occupational attainment between the three races. Failure to do so will imply that 
possible barriers remain in present day markets. In order to achieve this, the entire mining 
sample of 8,956 individuals is utilised. Furthermore, individual occupation data needs to be 
converted into a continuous scale variable allowing for such an analysis to be carried out, as 
seen in Mariotti (2011), and Burger and Jafta (2010). 
A continuous scale allows infinite graded distinctions between occupations that are captured 
within a single parameter (Ganzeboom et al., 1992). Notwithstanding the loss in some 
information through this conversion, increased multivariate analysis is made capable. 
Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996) highlight two skill based rankings that can be utilised in this 
conversion. The first is ISEI, developed by Ganzeboom et al. (1992), while the second is 
Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS) derived by Treiman (1977). Both 
rankings are derived from the International Standard Classification of Occupation 1988 
(ISCO88) of the International Labor Office (ILO) which was the basis of SASCO, the 
criterion used to code occupation in the data sets.  
The two rankings differ in their construction as follows; ISEI is a socioeconomic scale (SEO) 
created from weighted sums of numerous socioeconomic qualities such as level of education 
required, income and father’s socioeconomic characteristics, calculated from 16 countries. 
While SIOPS is a prestige measure, obtained from popular beliefs of occupational status 
(Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996). It was constructed from 60 separate prestige scales from 53 
countries
26
. ISEI ranges from 16 to 88 whilst SIOPS ranges from 13 to 78 in the data set. 
Whereas SEO scales are based on credible criterion on educational requirements, income and 
the like, prestige scales lack the criterion validity and are biased towards their 
countries/cultures of origin (Yogev, 1980; Stewart, 1983). Ideally to ensure compatibility, 
surveys should be run to certify the scales are significantly correlated to your subject sample 
(Yogev, 1980).  However, such validation tests fall out of the scope of this thesis and as a 




Table 5 below illustrates the average occupational rankings by race. Whites on average have 
the highest mean of both ranks followed by Coloureds then Blacks. 
 
 
                                                          
26
 11 of which were from Africa, 15 from Western Europe, 17 from Asia and Oceania, 13 From Latin America 
and the Caribbean (Yogev, 1980) 
27
 ISEI and SIOPS have a correlation of 0.8938 in the data set. 
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Table 5: Average Occupation Ranks by Race 
Race Black Coloured White 
Average ISEI 32.347 34.913 41.406 
Average SIOPS 33.297 35.034 42.045 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 extend the breakdown of the occupational rank by considering the 
movements across the years exhibited by each race. Each graph depicts the cumulative 
distribution plots for the years 2002 to 2005, 2006 to2009 and 2010 to 2013.  
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Figure 1: Cumulative Distribution of Black ISEI rank 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 1 shows there has been some movement between occupations by Blacks, especially at 
the extremes. Specifically, there has been an increase in their proportion of employment at 
the lowest and highest ranked occupations. This shift seems to corroborate Section 5’s 
findings in that Blacks have increased their occupational skill level surpassing the Coloureds 
in a number of them. In addition, there have been those that have benefited at the top level 
(Crankshaw, 2012). The middle of the range of ranks seems to have remained relatively 
similar. 
  
21 | P a g e  
 
Figure 2: Cumulative Distribution of Coloured ISEI rank 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
According to Figure 2 above, Coloureds have had increased proportions employed in the 
lower ranks, and fewer employed in the highest ranks as the years have progressed. This 
appears to agree with the earlier findings that Coloureds held the lowest occupation levels 
among the races. Across the middle range there, however, seems to have been upward 
mobility demonstrated. 
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Figure 3: Cumulative Distribution of White ISEI rank 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
There has not been much movement along the decade for Whites as noted in Figure 3. 
Between 2006 and 2009 there was a general drop in employment rank level. It however 
regained its initial 2002 to 2005 levels. The extremes have remained relatively unchanged. 
 
Observable Skill Sets 
There has been a general convergence of education levels between the races over the years 
(Burger & Jafta, 2010; Keswell, Girdwood & Leibbrant, 2011). Driven by full access to 
education for all and Whites not being able to increase their levels much further, these 
convergences have had a substantial effect in closing the occupation gap (Burger & Jafta, 
2010). However, the general level of Black education remains considerably low. 
Void of restrictive employment and education regulations in addition to equal payment to all 
races at a particular occupation, job attainment would be expected to be related to the 
inherent skill of the potential employees. Consequently considering educational attainment 
may explain the disparities among the races occupational levels.  
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Educational attainment cannot be summed entirely by number of years of schooling. The 
quality offered is equally important. Across the country the quality of education offered has 
remained polarised on provincial, socio-economic and institutional (that is between formerly 
White and Black schools) lines (Spreen & Vally, 2006; Leibbrandt, Woolard, McEwen & 
Koep, 2009; Taylor et al., 2011). Although non-personnel public spending is well-targeted, 
such that the poorest fifth of schools receive roughly six times higher than the richest fifth of 
schools; schools in better off communities remain superiorly resourced due to being able to 
charge fees (Taylor et al., 2011). 
As stated in Section 5, the quality differential translates to differentiated outcomes. Van der 
Berg et al. (2011) found that by the age of eight there already existed large performance gaps 
between school children in the top 20% of the population and the rest. This highlighted the 
potential distinctions at such early ages. 
Coupled with socio-economic and environmental factors, children’s cognitive skills 
development proves more complex than simply the maximum number of school years. With 
the dataset not allowing controlling for quality related measures, true causation will be 
difficult to ascertain.  
On average Blacks maximum educational attainment in the sample was Grade 9, followed by 
Coloureds with Grade 11 and Whites successfully achieving Matriculation certificates. Table 
6 further shows the proportional break down of the highest attained level of education by 
race. 
 
Table 6: Highest Level of Education as a Proportion of Each Race (%) 
Education Black Coloured White 
No Schooling 7.09 2.51 1.90 
Some Primary 17.87 5.92 0.07 
Complete Primary 8.33 5.24 0.29 
Some Secondary 35.52 36.08 23.50 
Grade 12/ Std 10 23.83 34.17 45.39 
Higher 7.36 17.08 28.84 
Note: Higher includes diplomas or certificates with Matriculation 
certificates, degrees, postgraduate degrees or diplomas 
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Table 7: Average Education by Race 
Race Black Coloured White 
Average 9.76 11.58 13.16 
Std. Dev (3.838) (2.982) (1.503) 
Notes: Education is a variable denoting maximum level of education attained, coded in the following 
manner: 0: no schooling, 1 – 12: Primary school, 13: Grade 12/Matriculation/NTC III, 14: 
Certificates or Diplomas without Grade 12 and 15: any Higher education. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
To investigate the significance of educational attainment and experience in determining the 
level of skill of the occupation employed in, ordinary least squares (OLS) is utilized. Each 
race is modelled separately to determine the differing returns to education and experience.  
The regression model used is as follows: 
                                               (2) 
where            is the occupational index being analysed,         is the maximum 
education attained,    is a vector of individual as well as industry
28
 and employer 
characteristics,      is a dummy variable for each ethnic group and    is the random error 




                                                          
28
The different industries within the mining sector are coal and lignite, gold and uranium ore, metal ores, iron 
ores, non-ferrous metal ores, mining and quarrying, stone quarrying clay and sandpits, diamond, mining and 
quarrying not elsewhere classified, service activities incidental to mining of minerals and extraction of crude 
petroleum and natural gas and the services related. 
29
 SIOPS output can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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 Firm Characteristics 
























 Note: Each regression contains marital status, gender, industry and medical care or health insurance 
variables. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 *Significant at the 10 % level 
**Significant at the 5 % level 
***Significant at the 1 % level 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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From the estimation, increased education has a higher return for Blacks than any other race. 
This is possibly driven by the low educational base intrinsic with Blacks, where companies 
are quick to hire educated Blacks, especially to fill BBBEE positions (Sallaz, 2005). Blacks 
were in addition rewarded further for less than 25 years of experience, while Whites were 
rewarded more for over 25 years. 
It should be noted that for Whites the achievement of a maximum of completed Primary, 
some Secondary and completed Matriculation had negative and significant (save for 
Matriculation) effects on ISEI (and SIOPS) index. Weiss (1995) proposed that high ability 
individuals who gain more from schooling and value future earnings essentially would stay in 
school longer. With Whites generally being more educated, those not achieving higher 
education are generally of lower ability, thus lower ranking jobs. Furthermore, older White 
generations in the dataset are more likely to be higher educated than younger generations, 
with Blacks experiencing the reverse. This could be showing the remnant bias from older 
generations, versus the current skill based employment in younger generations. Dropping 
firm and industry level variables produced consistent results as shown in Appendix A4. 
 
Oaxaca Decomposition 
The results above can be used to separate the average ISEI gap between races into explained 
and unexplained portions. This is achieved using a variant of Oaxaca wage decomposition 
(1973) as displayed in Mariotti (2011) where she derives the explained and unexplained 
difference between African and White occupation ranks in South Africa in 1970 and 1980, as 
well as Stewart (1983) who compares average hourly earnings between White United 
Kingdom born individuals and Black immigrants. 
With no discrimination in the labour market, each race would be on average able to achieve 
equivalent rankings of occupation given a particular characteristic traits (Oaxaca, 1973), 
which would manifest in similar coefficients in Equation (2). The decomposition uses this 
premise by inserting the average characteristics of one race into the predicted coefficients of 
Equation (2) of another race and examining the disparity. 
The following equation breaks down the difference in average occupational rank, 
          , into an explained and unexplained part. 
 
                                               (3) 
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 Where  
      and       are the functions of race l and k from Equation (2), that is the vector of 
coefficients derived from running the regressions. 
    and       are vectors of mean values for the variables in Equation (2) for the two comparison 
races. 
And therefore           is a function determining what the Occupational rank of race k would 
be if a member of that race was exposed to the same market structure as race l 
experiences. This is ordinarily not observable. 
The first set of brackets in (3) produces the explained component of the difference in average 
occupational rankings, while the second shows the unexplained portion. The results of this 




Table 9: Oaxaca Decomposition of Average ISEI gap with Explained and Unexplained 
Percentage of Occupational Rank 
Races Compared % Explained % Unexplained 
Black - Coloured 60.51 39.49 
Black - White 41.94 58.05 
Coloured - White 24.91 75.09 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
A large portion of the difference between the races occupational attainment cannot be 
explained by the model. Black and Coloured gaps are mostly explained at 60.5% by 
education, experience, demographic and firm specific details. The discrepancy between 
Whites and the other races proves more difficult to explain. 58.1% and 75.1% remains 
unexplained between Blacks and Coloureds, respectively. 
Dropping industry and firm level variables increases the explained difference between 
Coloured and Whites to over 40%. This however drops the explained part of Black – 
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 SIOPS occupational gap analysis can be found in Table A2 in the appendix. 
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Table 10: Oaxaca Decomposition with no Industry or Firm Variables of Average ISEI gap 
with Explained and Unexplained Percentage of Occupational Rank 
Races Compared % Explained % Unexplained 
Black - Coloured 47.15 52.85 
Black - White 39.30 60.70 
Coloured - White 42.91 57.09 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
These results might suggest that there could still be some skill based discrimination present in 
the mining labour sector that has been propagated through intergenerational transfers after the 
repealing of the colour bars. However, various other observationally equivalent causal 
representations go untested thus requiring caution in making such a conclusion. 
As mentioned above, the education variable used in the dataset ignores its quality, which 
would serve to more effectively describe the returns to education. Variables relating to school 
and teacher characteristics would shed light on this. 
In addition, Government policies such as the Skills Development Act mentioned in Section 2 
above, could be causing significant skews in the lower education levels through their 
development and education platforms. Despite these programmes having direct effects on 
employment, they may not register as education in the dataset as only diplomas or certificates 
that last at least 6 months are recorded (StatsSA, 2013). 
Further still, factors such as ambition and childhood influences like socio-economic 
background affect how well a student does in school, as well as the jobs sought after (Brown, 
Moon & Zoloth, 1980; Taylor et al., 2011). 
Crankshaw (2012) describes Whites as having urbanized much earlier than other races and 
therefore were able to take advantage in the growth in demand for high-skilled and 
managerial occupations. Non-Whites having been the last to migrate into urban towns would 
therefore have significantly lower skills and as a result lower ranked occupations. 
Furthermore, the remote sites of many mines might affect the employment decisions 
differently with each race. For example, Coloureds who are situated more in the Western 
Cape where few mines exist may not be willing to migrate higher North to work in the mines. 
It is important to note as well that this analysis considers only individuals that are already part 
of the labour force. There could potentially be significantly more bias between those applying 
for the same post and not getting them. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that considerable caution has to be placed on the educational systems 
in the country to increase general level of education and quality. 
 




This paper set out to determine if job reservations had persisted in the present day mining 
sector by first tracing the source and development of the colour bars from the colonial era to 
their eventual abolition in 1879. 
Focussing on four occupations frequently cited in the draconian legislation; Banksman, 
Blaster, Winding Engine Driver and Engineer, as well as a representative unskilled 
occupation, Labourer, ordered probit regressions were run to test the hypothesis. There was 
little evidence found supporting their persistence. This came as no surprise with 
developments in technology that have changed the definition of skill. 
Despite controlling for skill by focussing on those with a lower than matriculation education, 
Whites were found to have a bias towards higher skilled jobs. Using an Oaxaca 
decomposition, the paper then set out to determine if this bias was present throughout the 
mining industry. This was achieved by considering how much of the average difference in 
occupational gaps could be explained by observable skill sets. 
A large portion of the gap especially between Whites and the other races (58.1% with Blacks 
and 75.1% with Coloureds) could not be explained. This implied either there was still some 
skill based discrimination or the model was unable to pick up other observable and 
unobservable characteristics explaining occupational attainment. Without adequate controls 
in the dataset such as education quality and the individual’s socio-economic background, a 
skill based causal discrimination cannot be confidently concluded. 
This paper’s analysis could be improved if datasets on the Certificates of Competency related 
to the occupations analysed could be retrieved from the Department of Mineral Resources 
(DMR), added with greater specification of educational quality. In addition, running surveys 
to adjust the prestige scale, SIOPS, to ensure higher correlation with actual South Africans 
would improve the accuracy of the results. 
There appears to be a divide between policy rhetoric and actually reality on the ground with 
regards to Affirmative Action measures (Sallaz, 2005; Burger & Jafta, 2010). This means that 
numerically those previously disadvantaged are meeting the hiring quota, but in effect not 
sharing the power or skill level. Different policies should be identified to attempt to redress 
this further.  
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Appendix 






 Education Level 
         Some Primary -0.000 
 






































































































 Firm Characteristics 
























 Note: Each regression contains year started employment, married, male, industry and medical care 
variables. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 *Significant at the 10 % level 
**Significant at the 5 % level 
***Significant at the 1 % level 
Sourced: Author’s calculations. 
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Table A2: Oaxaca Decomposition of Average SIOPS gap with Explained and Unexplained 
Percentage of Occupational Rank 
Races Compared % Explained % Unexplained 
Black - Coloured 40.65 59.35 
Black - White 39.81 60.19 
Coloured - White 28.02 71.98 
Sourced: Author’s calculations. 
 
Table A3: Correlation Between Education and Age by race 
Education Black Coloured White 
Level Of Education Age Age Age 
Some Primary 0.258 0.140 -0.0173 
Completed Primary 0.091 0.229 -0.020 
Some Secondary -0.045 0.091 0.127 
Matriculation -0.280 -0.244 -0.107 
Higher 0.1404 -0.072 0.012 
N 7142 439 1365 
Sourced: Author’s calculations. 
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 Firm Characteristics 
























 Note: Each regression contains year started employment, married, male, and log of GDP Growth rate 
variables. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 *Significant at the 10 % level 
**Significant at the 5 % level 
***Significant at the 1 % level 
Sourced: Author’s calculations. 
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Standard Errors p-value 
Race 
     
   Coloured 
 
-0.354 ** (0.160) 0.027 
   White 
 
0.418 *** (0.070) 0.000 
      Education Level 















   Grade 12/ Std 10  -0.033  (0.098) 0.741 
   Higher  1.421 *** (0.153) 0.000 
      
Location 
        Eastern Cape 
 
-1.304 *** (0.439) 0.003 
   Northern Cape 
 
-1.227 *** (0.291) 0.000 
   Free State 
 
-0.669 ** (0.292) 0.022 
   Kwazulu-Natal 
 
-1.191 *** (0.347) 0.001 
   North West 
 
-0.894 *** (0.291) 0.002 
   Gauteng 
 
-0.820 *** (0.295) 0.005 
   Mpumalanga 
 
-1.004 *** (0.294) 0.001 
   Limpopo 
 
-1.454 *** (0.295) 0.000 
      Demographics 
        Age 
 
0.214 *** (0.080) 0.008 
   Married 
 
0.193 *** (0.059) 0.001 
   5 to 15 Years Experience 
 
0.159 * (0.083) 0.054 
   15 to 25 Years Experience 
 
0.473 *** (0.095) 0.000 
   More than 25 Years Experience 
 
0.273 *** (0.059) 0.008 
      Goodness-of-fit 
        Log-likelihood 
 
-3633.8141 
      Wald chi
2
 with 20 df 
 
633.79 





      N 
 
2973 
   Note: The regression contains Age2, Age3, Male and year of survey control variable as well. Robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 *Significant at the 10 % level 
**Significant at the 5 % level 
***Significant at the 1 % level 
Sourced: Author’s calculations. 
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Table A6: Marginal Race Effects 
Dependent Variable Labourer Banksmen Blaster Driver Engineer 
      Predicted Probabilities 
     
   P (Y=1|Black = 1) 0.405 0.359 0.051 0.155 0.031 
   P (Y=1|Coloured =1) 0.545 0.313 0.036 0.093 0.013 
   P (Y=1|White = 1) 0.255 0.363 0.065 0.244 0.073 
 
     
Race Effect 
        Coloured Effect 34.60% -12.73% -29.31% -40.00% -57.47% 
   White Effect -37.02% 1.16% 28.28% 57.44% 138.52% 





, education, categorical experience levels, province, male and year. 
Sourced: Author’s calculations. 
 
